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Abstract
We consider the forecast aggregation problem in repeated settings, where
the forecasts are done on a binary event. At each period multiple experts
provide forecasts about an event. The goal of the aggregator is to aggregate
those forecasts into a subjective accurate forecast. We assume that experts
are Bayesian; namely they share a common prior, each expert is exposed to
some evidence, and each expert applies Bayes rule to deduce his forecast.
The aggregator is ignorant with respect to the information structure (i.e.,
distribution over evidence) according to which experts make their predic-
tion. The aggregator observes the experts’ forecasts only. At the end of
each period the actual state is realized. We focus on the question whether
the aggregator can learn to aggregate optimally the forecasts of the experts,
where the optimal aggregation is the Bayesian aggregation that takes into
account all the information (evidence) in the system.
We consider the class of partial evidence information structures, where
each expert is exposed to a different subset of conditionally independent
signals. Our main results are positive; We show that optimal aggregation
can be learned in polynomial time in a quite wide range of instances of the
partial evidence environments. We provide a tight characterization of the
instances where learning is possible and impossible.
1
1 Introduction
How should an aggregtor aggregate forecasts made by different experts to a single
subjective forecast? This question has been studied up to some extent in the liter-
ature, see discussion in Section 1.4. In order to address this forecast aggregation
problem theoretically, we first should specify:
(a) How do experts make their forecasts?
(b) What does the aggregator know about the problem?
(c) How do we measure the accuracy of a forecast?
How do experts make their forecasts? We adopt the standard Bayesian
modelling of the problem. More concretely, we assume that experts are Bayesian
and honest.
There is some future binary event Ω = {0, 1}. Experts share a common prior
µ ∈ ∆(Ω) about the future event. Experts are exposed to different (possibly
correlated) evidence which has correlation with the future event. Henceforth,
we use the standard terminology of signal to refer to an evidence. Each expert
applies Bayes role to deduce her subjective posterior belief about the event, based
on the signals that she observes (i.e., experts are Bayesian). Each expert reports
truthfully her subjective posterior probability (i.e., experts are honest).
What does the aggregator know about the problem? The aggregator is
ignorant with respect to the structure according to which the signals are drawn,
and he does not observe the signals. Aggregator observes experts’ forecasts only.
I.e., aggregator does not know the evidence that led each one of the experts to
his subjective forecast, only the forecasts themself. We distinguish between prior-
ignorant aggregator (one that does not know the prior) and prior-aware aggregator
(one that shares the common prior with the experts).
The distinction between the ignorant aggregator and the Bayesian experts is
realistic in many scenarios. For instance, an ordinary web user who searches for a
weather forecast has no understanding in weather. The only available information
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for him is the forecasts of the forecasting agencies (experts). Forecasting agencies,
on the other hand, base their forecasts on evidence and have a precise models of
weather forecasting. Thus, it is plausible to assume that their forecast is done in
a much more rational manner; I.e., in a Bayesian manner.
The problem of one-shot aggregation without any knowledge of the aggregator
is known to be impossible (in a very strong sense) in case where the number of
experts is large, Arieli et al. [2017a]. In this paper we consider a repeated setting.
Initially, indeed the aggregator has no information about the problem. At the end
of each period aggregator gets to see the realized state, and thus can extract some
information about the problem, and about the abilities of each expert to predict.
How do we measure the accuracy of a forecast? And what is an optimal
forecast? A standard measurement of forecasts accuracy is done by proper scoring
rules, i.e., a function from a forecast and a realized state into scores (payments)
that incentivizes Bayesian agents to report their belief. The two most common
scoring rules are the square loss and the logarithmic loss. In this paper we focus on
the later. An optimal forecast (i.e., the one with the minimal loss) is the forecast
that aggregates all the signals in the system in a Bayesian manner. Note that in
order to make an optimal forecast, the aggregator should have access to all signals
and he should know the distribution according to which these signals are drawn.
This information is not available to the aggregator in our setting.
In this paper we focus on the question whether the aggregator can learn to
aggregate forecasts optimally, after sufficiently many periods? If so, how? And
how fast can he learn to do so?
We emphasize that unlike standard expert advice problem Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi
[2006] where typically the benchmark is the best expert, here we set the most chal-
lenging benchmark; I.e., we compare the performance of the aggregator with the
optimal forecast at each period. Typically the best aggregated forecast will defer
from the forecasts of all experts, and in particular the best expert performance
will be inferior to the performance of the optimal-forecast at each period.
3
1.1 Partial evidence environment
It is hard to model what precisely is the information that is available to experts
in realistic forecasting problems. Most of the Bayesian theoretical literature sig-
nificantly simplifies the environment, by assuming that experts are exposed to
independent information conditional on the state, e.g., Bikhchandani et al. [1992],
Jackson [2010]. This abstraction of the problem indeed make the information
aggregation problem much more tractable. However, in some environments this
assumption might be too demanding. For instance, two experts of weather fore-
cast may use the same measurement apparatus in their forecast model. Experts
in the political arena might evaluate candidates chances of success in the elections
according to their publicly observed attributes (diversity in the evaluation might
be caused by different attributes that experts take into account in their model).
On the other extreme, allowing arbitrary correlation among experts evidence make
the problem of forecast aggregation not tractable1. Thus we suggest an intermedi-
ate model of partial evidence, which on the one hand is not too simplified: it allows
correlation between experts which might be caused due to exposure to the same
evidence. On the other hand, the model is not too complicated, which will make
the problem tractable (at least in some cases). Very similar model of information
diversity has been studied recently by Satopa¨a¨ et al. [2016], Ernst et al. [2016],
see a discussion in Section 1.4.
The partial evidence model consists of a finite set of conditionally independent
signals [m] (so far we are aligned with the standard literature). Unlike the stan-
dard literature, we assume that each expert i ∈ [n] is exposed to a subset of these
signals, and uses only these signals to calculate his posterior belief. We denote
by A ∈ {0, 1}n×m the evidence matrix, where A(i, j) = 1 indicates that expert i
observes signal j. We recall that our aggregator does not know how many signals
1Even in the simple case of binary signals for each expert, just the description of an arbitrary
correlated distribution over the profiles of signals is exponential in the number of experts. More-
over, even for the simplest case of two experts with binary signals, the impossibility result of
Arieli et al. [2017a] Proposition 1 for the one shot aggregation problem can be easily extended
to the same impossibility result for the repeated forecast aggregation problem.
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there are, what is the distribution over the signals, and does not know A.
1.2 Summary of Results
We consider two settings, of a static and a dynamic environment. In both envi-
ronments the evidence matrix A (and also the set of experts and set of signals)
remains fixed. This assumption correspond to the fact that forecasting agencies do
not frequently change the model according to which they produce their forecast.
In the static environment the information structure remains fixed along the pro-
cess. This scenario may correspond for instance to scenarios of medical prognosis
where initially, before any information has been exposed, the problem is identical.
We show that if the evidence matrix A is not injective, even the prior-aware aggre-
gator cannot learn the optimal aggregation (see Proposition 1) irrespective of the
number of samples. The main positive result shows that whenever A is injective,
even the prior-ignorant aggregator can learn the optimal aggregation; Moreover,
he can do so after a polynomial (in n and m) number of samples (see Theorem 1).
In the dynamic environment, the information structure changes along time
(in an adversarial manner). For instance, in the weather forecasting example,
the probability distribution of rain/no rain and the distribution of outcomes of
the measurement apparatuses varies during the seasons of the year. We restrict
attention to the case where A is injective (because otherwise learning is impossible
even in the static setting). We show that the prior-ignorant aggregtor cannot
learn the optimal aggregation (see Proposition 2) irrespective of the number of
samples. The main positive result shows that the prior-aware aggregator can
learn the optimal aggregation; Moreover, he can do so after a polynomial number
of samples (see Theorem 2).
1.3 Techniques
The positive results are based on the following idea. The model, as given, is non-
linear. However, once we translate the problem into the log-likelihood space (i.e.,
we translate experts’ forecasts to log-likelihoods), then the desired Bayesian aggre-
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Table 1: The possible and the impossible in learning of optimal forecast aggrega-
tion with respect to the three relevant parameters of the problem: whether the
evidence matrix is injective or not, whether the aggregator is prior-aware or not,
and whether the environment is static or dynamic.
Injective A Non injective A
prior-aware prior-ignorant prior-aware prior-ignorant
static X X static × ×
dynamic X × dynamic × ×
gation (of all the information) becomes a liner problem. The (minus) logarithmic
loss in the log-likelihood representation turns out to be a convex function. Thus,
we can leverage tools from the paradigm of online convex optimization Hazan
[2016], mainly a regret-minimization algorithm known as online gradient descent
(OGD), which we apply in order to converge to the optimal linear aggregation.
The following two obstacles arise in the application of OGD. The first is that OGD
requires as feedback the gradient of the loss function on each round, which is not
available in our setting. We overcome this difficulty by replacing the loss function
of interest with an unbiased estimator, for which the gradient vector is known,
and thus, we are able to obtain sublinear regret bounds which hold in expecta-
tion. The second obstacle, is that the input to the algorithm at each period is not
necessarily bounded ; Although forecasts are bounded in [0, 1], their log-likelihood
is not necessarily bounded, which may potentially cause the gradient feedback to
OGD to explode. We overcome this obstacle by setting an appropriate threshold
τ to the forecasts. We treat differently the cases where all experts provide fore-
casts in the segment [τ, 1− τ ], and the case where at least one expert provide an
“extreme” forecast. In the former case we simply apply the stochastic gradient
decent. In the latter we provide a forecast that is similar to that of the “extreme”
expert.
The translation of the problem to the log-likelihood space inherently assumes
the knowledge of the prior. Although in the static model we consider a prior-
ignorant aggregator, this aggregator may provide a good estimation for the prior
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simply by counting the fraction of rounds where the realization turned out to be
ω = 1. We show that good estimation for the prior is sufficient in order to apply
our techniques, which implies the result in the static model for the prior-ignorant
aggregator.
1.4 Related Literature
The research question in this paper is in the interplay of machine learning and
forecast aggregation. Below we discuss the relevant literature in this two areas.
1.4.1 Forecast aggregation
Many different heuristics to aggregate forecasts have been suggested in the litera-
ture; linear heuristics Stone et al. [1961], Genest and McConway [1990], DeGroot and Mortera
[1991], multiplicative heuristics Bordley [1982], and other non-linear heuristics
Armstrong [2001], Polyakova and Journel [2007], Primo et al. [2009], Ranjan and Gneiting
[2010], Satopa¨a¨ et al. [2014]. These heuristics are either optimal on some concrete
information structure, or have the convenience of simplicity. The empirical ap-
proach to forecast aggregation typically starts with a class of simple (possibly para-
metric) heuristics, and checks which heuristic preforms optimally on the training
set (i.e., optimizes the parameters). Substantial part of the forecast aggregation
literature adopts the empirical approach, see Bermingham and DAgostino [2014]
for an excellent survey of the empirical literature, and the more recent studies
Ungar et al. [2012], Forlines et al. [2014]. However, it is not clear which class of
heuristics we should start with at the first place, and there are no theoretical
guarantees for the performance of these heuristics. Our positive results suggest
an interesting class of initial (relatively simple) heuristics: linear heuristics over
the log-likelihood space with a “prior adjustment”, see details in Sections 4.1 and
4.2.1. This class of heuristics has a theoretical justification: for a quite wide class
of information structures - the partial evidence class - the optimal aggregation
belongs to this simple class of heuristics.
The partial evidence environment has been suggested previously in Satopa¨a¨ et al.
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[2016], Ernst et al. [2016] to capture somewhat “realistic” environments of infor-
mation. Satopa¨a¨ et al. [2016], Ernst et al. [2016] focus on the Bayesian aggrega-
tion problem in such an environment where the signals are real numbers, and the
binary event is whether the sum of all numbers is positive/negative. Unlike our
paper, Satopa¨a¨ et al. [2016], Ernst et al. [2016] focus on an aggregator that knows
precisely the information structure.
The setting of an ignorant aggregator that aggregates forecasts of Bayesian ex-
perts has been introduced in Arieli et al. [2017a,b]. Unlike our paper, Arieli et al.
[2017a,b] focus on the one-shot aggregation problem. Arieli et al. [2017a] indicate
that the one-shot aggregation problem for large number of experts is impossible.
Our positive results in this paper indicate that in a repeated setting the optimal
aggregation is possible in quite wide class of information structures.
1.4.2 Machine Learning
The problem of sequential prediction with adversarial data has been studied exten-
sively in the machine learning literature in the past couple of decades, mainly under
the title online learning, see for instance the excellent text Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi
[2006]. The best-known problem in this setting is known as prediction with expert
advice Littlestone and Warmuth [1994], Vovk [1990], in which the typical bench-
mark is the best expert in hindsight. A variety of advice-aggregation algorithms
that attain this benchmark has been suggested. In particular regret minimizing al-
gorithms. The most competitive benchmark is that of best decision in each period,
which obviously is unattainable in general adversarial settings. The standard lit-
erature in the expert advice problem assumes that expert advices are adversarial.
In this paper we impose some unknown to the aggregator Bayesian structure on
the advices of the experts, and ask weather in such environments decision maker
can achieve the best-decision in each period benchmark.
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2 Model
The unknown state of nature is Ω = {0, 1} with the common prior µ = P(ω = 1).
There are m signals s1, ..., sm in the system with possible values si ∈ Si, these
are the evidence in the system. E.g., in the weather forecasting case there are
measurement apparatus on which the forecasting models are based, in the medical
prognosis case there are the medical tests of the patient. The correlation between
ω and the signal sj ∈ Sj is given by the distribution Cj ∈ ∆(Ω × Sj), when
Cj(ω = 1) = µ. Every signal sj ∈ Sj defines a posterior belief about ω, xj(sj) =
P(ω = 1|sj) ∈ [0, 1]. The distribution Cj defines two conditional distributions C0j
and C1j . We assume that conditioned on ω, C
ω
j is independent of C
ω
j′ for j 6= j′.
We denote by s = (s1, ..., sm) the profile of signals, and by C the joint distribution
over (ω, s).
It is well known (see e.g., Bordley [1982]) that the Bayesian formula for aggre-
gation of conditionally independent signals is given by:
r∗(s) = P(ω = 1|s1, ..., sm) =
(1− µ)m−1Πmj=1xj(sj)
(1− µ)m−1Πmj=1xj(sj) + µm−1Πmj=1(1− xj(sj))
.
(1)
Note that P(ω = 1|s1, ..., sm) is, equivalently, the optimal forecast in the given
environment, that aggregates all the available information in the system.
Expert i ∈ [n] observes only the signals (sj)j∈Ai where Ai ⊂ [m]. We denote
by A ∈ {0, 1}n×m the evidence matrix, where A(i, j) = 1 iff j ∈ Ai. Since expert i
is Bayesian and honest, her posterior belief (and also forecast) is given by:
Fi(s) = P(ω = 1|(sj)j∈Ai) =
(1− µ)|Ai|−1Πj∈Aixj(sj)
(1− µ)|Ai|−1Πj∈Ajxj(sj) + µ|Ai|−1Πj∈Ai(1− xj(sj))
.
(2)
We denote by F = (Fi)i∈[n] ∈ [0, 1]n the profile of forecasts of all experts. This
is precisely the object that is observed by the aggregator, according to which he
should determine his own subjective forecast r ∈ [0, 1]. We measure the aggrega-
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tor’s performance with respect to the logarithmic loss :
l(r, ω) =


− ln(r) if ω = 1
− ln(1− r) if ω = 0.
The aggregator’s objective is to minimize his expected logarithmic loss, which is
given by L(y) = −r∗(s) ln(r) − (1 − r∗(s)) ln(1 − r). The expected loss L(y) is
minimized at r = r∗(s), because logarithmic loss is a proper scoring rule. Unfortu-
nately, the aggregator does not know r∗(s), because the only information available
to him is F = F (s). We set the most competitive benchmark for the aggregator:
he should minimize the regret R(y) = L(r)− L(r∗(s)).
We consider a repeated setting, where on each period t, the aggregator observes
the current profile of forecasts Ft and the history of the past forecasts and realiza-
tions (Ft′ , ωt′)t′<t. The aggregator provides a forecast rt (before the actual state
is realized). We distinguish between two environments. In the static environment
the partial evidence information structure (A,C) remains fixed. In the dynamic
environment the information structure C varies over time, but A remains fixed.
Namely the information structure along time is a sequence (A,Ct)t.
Definition 1. We say that the aggregator can grantee a total regret of R(T ) within
T periods in the static (dynamic) environment2 if there exists an algorithm for the
aggregator, that guarantees
∑
t∈T
Est∼Ct,ωt∼Ct|st(l(rt, ωt)− l(r∗(st), ωt)) ≤ R(T )
for all partial evidence information structures (A,C) (for all sequences of partial
evidence information structures (A,Ct)t∈[T ]). We say that aggregator can learn the
optimal aggregation, if the aggregator can grantee a total regret of R(T ) = o(T )
within T periods.
2Alternatively, one may define learning with respect to sample complexity rather than re-
peated settings; I.e., how many samples are needed in order to make a good forecast at a given
period. Our techniques (for the positive and the negative results) can be easily modified to
address this latter definition using, by-now a standard, online-to-batch conversion technique, see
for instance Hazan [2016] (Chapter 9).
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3 Results
3.1 Static Environment
We start with an example that demonstrates that learning of optimal aggregation
is not always possible (even for very large/ infinite number of samples).
Example 1. Consider a scenario where the prior is µ = 1
2
. We have three con-
ditional i.i.d. signals with outcome si = 0, 1 where si is the correct state with
probability 3
4
. Note that xi(0) =
1
4
and xi(1) =
3
4
. We have two experts. The first
observes the signals {s1, s2}, and the second {s2, s3}.
For the sake of argument, assume that the aggretor knows all of the above
parameters of the problem. It is not obvious that the aggregator indeed can learn
all of the above parameters precisely (or approximately) after sufficiently many
periods; but this is an upper bound on the information that the aggregator can
extract from a sequence of realizations.
With probability 1
2
· 3
4
· 1
4
· 3
4
+ 1
2
· 1
4
· 3
4
· 1
4
= 3
32
the realization of signals will be
(0, 1, 0). In this case both experts will forecast 1
2
, whereas the optimal aggregation
is r∗((0, 1, 0)) = 1
4
.
With same probability 3
32
, the realization of signals will be (1, 0, 1). In this
case, again, both experts will forecast 1
2
, whereas the optimal aggregation is
r∗((1, 0, 1)) = 3
4
.
Note that the aggregator in both cases observes F = (1
2
, 1
2
). It is easy to check
that the best aggregator can do is to forecast r = 1
2
when he observes the vector
(1
2
, 1
2
), therefore his expected regret is at least
6
32
[
1
4
ln(
1
4
)) +
3
4
ln(
3
4
)− 1
4
ln(
1
2
)− 3
4
ln(
1
2
)
]
≈ 0.024.
The failure of aggregation in this example is a result of the fact that the
evidence matrix
A =

1 1 0
0 1 1


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is not injective. This example can be generalized to the following impossibility
result about learning of optimal aggregation in the case where the evidence matrix
is not injective.
Proposition 1. If3 ker(A) \ {z ∈ Rm : ∑i zi = 0} 6= ∅ then the prior-aware
aggregator cannot learn the optimal aggregation (even) in a static environment.
The idea of the proof is similar to the example. We generate two instances
where the optimal aggregation defers in these two instances, but the aggregator
observes exactly the same profile of forecasts. Such a construction is possible
because A maps two different vectors to one (not injective). The formal proof is
relegated to Section 4.
Our first main positive result states that whenever A is injective, the aggregator
can learn to predict optimally for a large enough number of samples. Moreover,
if A is ”injective enough” (which is measured by its minimal singular value), then
a dataset of size poly(n) is sufficient for learning of optimal aggregation.
We denote by σmin(A) the minimal singular value of A, i.e., σmin(A)
2 is the
minimal eigenvalue of the matrix A⊤A. Note in particular, that since A is injective,
σmin(A) > 0.
Theorem 1. In case A is injective, the prior-ignorant aggregator can learn the
optimal aggregation in a static environment. Moreover, for the class of information
structures (A,C) such that σmin(A) ≥ σ > 0, the prior-ignorant aggregator can
guarantee a total regret of R(T ) = O˜(nσ−1
√
T ) within T periods.
Remark 3.1. The minimal singular value effects the rate of learning. There are
matrices with low (or even zero) singular value where the rate of learning might
be slow (or impossible as stated in Proposition 1). However we may ask what
is the singular value in a ”typical” matrix. A standard approach to address this
question is to consider the class of all n × m 0/1 matrices and ask how many
of them has small minimal singular value (i.e., the learning is slow), which is
3Whether aggregator can learn the optimal aggregation in the esoteric case where ker(A) 6=
{0m} (i.e., A is not injective), but ker(A) ⊂ {z ∈ Rm :
∑
i
zi = 0} remains an open question.
12
equivalent to assuming that each node is an i.i.d. Bernoulli random variable
with p = 1
2
. Singular values of random matrices has been extensively studied.
In particular, Tropp and Gilbert [2007] (see Section III.C) have proved that in
case m
n
≤ C < 1 (namely we have substantially less signals than experts) with
probability close to 1 all singular values are greater than Ω(
√
n), or equivalently
σ−1 = O( 1√
n
). Interestingly, in such matrices the dependence of the singular value
improves the rate of learning. The total regret in such matrices can be bounded
by R(T ) = O˜(
√
nT ).
3.2 Dynamic Environment
In Proposition 1 we saw that injectiveness of A is a necessary condition for learn-
ing of optimal aggregation. This observation obviously holds also for the harder
dynamic environment. In Theorem 1 we saw that the prior-ignorant aggregator
is able to learn an optimal aggregation in the static environment. The following
Proposition shows that this is no longer the case for the dynamic environment.
Proposition 2. The prior-ignorant aggregtor cannot learn the optimal aggregation
in a dynamic environment, even for the case where A = Idn (i.e., experts receive
conditionally independent signals). Moreover, the aggregtor cannot guarantee a
regret below T ln 2 within T periods4.
Our second main positive result states that the prior-aware aggregator, can
learn the optimal aggregation even in the dynamic environment.
Theorem 2. In case A is injective, the prior-aware aggregator can learn the opti-
mal aggregation in a dynamic environment. Moreover, for the class of information
structures (A,C) such that σmin(A) ≥ σ the prior-aware aggregator can guarantee
a total regret of5 R(T ) = O˜(nσ−1
√
T ) within T periods.
4A regret of at most T ln 2 can be trivially guaranteed by always forecasting r ≡ 1
2
, irrespective
of experts’ forecasts.
5See Remark 3.1 for a discussion on the dependence on the minimal singular value.
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4 Proofs
We start with the proofs of the main positive results (Theorems 1 and 2). There-
after, we present the proofs of the negative results (Propositions 1 and 2).
The proofs involve quite a few notations. For the reader’s convenience we
include in Table 2 the notations that we use along the proofs with short description
for the notations. The formal definitions are given along the proofs.
4.1 Translation of the problem to the log-likelihood space
The model, as presented, is non-linear. However, it is equivalent to a linear model
by applying several (quite standard) operations.
First note that if we focus on the likelihoods of the events (rather than their
probabilities) equations (1) and (2) are equivalent to
r∗(s)
1− r∗(s) =
(1− µ)m−1Πmj=1xj(sj)
µm−1Πmj=1(1− xj(sj))
and
Fi(s)
1− Fi(s) =
(1− µ)|Ai|−1Πj∈Aixj(sj)
µ|Ai|−1Πj∈Ai(1− xj(sj))
.
(3)
We denote µ˜ = ln( µ
1−µ) and x˜j = ln(
xj(sj)
1−xj(sj)). By applying logarithm on the
expressions of equation (3) we get that
r˜∗(s) := ln(
r∗(s)
1− r∗(s)) =
m∑
j=1
x˜i − (m− 1)µ˜ =
m∑
j=1
(x˜i − µ˜) + µ˜ and
F˜i(s) := ln(
Fi(s)
1− Fi(s)) =
∑
j∈Ai
(x˜i − µ˜) + µ˜.
We denote F˜ (s) = (F˜i(s))i∈[n] ∈ Rn, y˜ = (x˜j − µ˜)j∈[m] ∈ Rm and 1k = (1, ..., 1) ∈
R
k (for any k) and we get the following linear expressions:
r˜∗(s) = y˜ · 1m + µ˜ and F˜ (s) = Ay˜ + µ˜1n.
Now, the idea is to formulate the original forecast aggregation problem in terms
of the, hidden from the aggregator, vector y˜, hidden from the aggregator, matrix
A, and the observed by the aggregator vector of forecasts F˜ = Ay˜ + µ˜1n.
In the original problem, the aggregator observes the vector F (s), and generates
a forecast r ∈ [0, 1]. In the equivalent formulation of the problem the aggregator
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Table 2: Summary of notations along the proof.
n Number of experts.
m Number of signals.
µ ∈ [0, 1] The prior.
µ˜ ∈ R The log-likelihood of the prior.
µˆ ∈ [0, 1] Estimator for µ.
ˆ˜µ ∈ R Estimator for µ˜.
s = (si)i∈[m] Signals profile.
r ∈ [0, 1] Aggregator’s forecast.
r˜ ∈ R Aggregator’s forecast in the log-likelihood space.
r∗(s) ∈ [0, 1] The optimal Bayesian aggregation of all signals.
r˜∗(s) ∈ R Log-likelihood of the optimal Bayesian aggregation.
Fi = Fi(s) ∈ [0, 1] Forecast made by expert i ∈ [n].
F˜i = F˜i(s) ∈ R Log-likelihood of the forecast made by expert i ∈ [n].
F˜ ∈ Rn Profile of log-likelihoods of the forecasts.
xi = xi(si) ∈ [0, 1] Posterior belief, after observing a single signal si.
x˜i = x˜i(si) ∈ R Log-likelihood of the Posterior belief, after observing a single signal si.
y˜i = x˜i − µ˜ Prior adjusted log-likelihood induced by the signal si.
y˜ = (y˜i)i∈[m] ∈ Rm Profile of prior adjusted log-likelihoods induced by all signals.
yˆ ∈ Rm Estimator for y˜.
z˜ = Ay˜ ∈ Rn A µ˜-shift of the observed forecast profile in the log-likelihood space.
z˜ = F˜ − µ˜1n
zˆ ∈ Rn Estimator for z˜.
h ∈ Rn Elements of the hypothesis class.
h∗ ∈ Rn Optimal hypothesis which corresponds to the optimal aggregation.
L(r, s) = L(r) ∈ [0,∞) Aggregator’s expected loss conditional on s.
L˜(r˜, s) = L˜(r˜) ∈ [0,∞) The analogue of the loss L in the log-likelihood space.
L(r˜, s) = L(r˜) ∈ [0,∞) The analogue of the loss L in the hypothesis class.
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observes Ay˜ ∈ Rn, and he reports a log-likelihood number r˜ ∈ R, where the
optimal report is r˜∗ = y˜ · 1m + µ˜ ∈ R. Note that the inverse function of the
log-likelihood w˜ = ln( w
1−w ) is the logit function w = logit(w˜) = (1 + exp(−w˜))−1.
Therefore, the aggregator’s logarithmic loss is given by
L˜(r˜) = −r∗(s) ln( 1
1 + exp(−r˜))− (1− r
∗(s)) ln(
exp(−r˜)
1 + exp(−r˜))
= −r∗(s)r˜ − ln( exp(−r˜)
1 + exp(−r˜))
= −(r∗(s)− 1)r˜ + ln(1 + exp(−r˜))
Summarizing, the original forecast aggregation problem is equivalent to the
following problem.
Definition 2. The problem log-likelihood aggregation at time t is given by
Input: A history of past realizations (Ay˜t′ + µ˜t′1n, ωt′)t′<t, where ωt′ is a Bernuli
random variable with probability of success r∗t′ = (1+ exp(−y˜t′ · 1m− µ˜t′))−1, and
the current vector Ay˜t + µ˜t1n ∈ Rn.
Loss: The aggregator chooses an action r˜t ∈ R and suffers an expected loss of
L˜(r˜t).
4.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Since we assume the aggregator is prior-aware, on each round t he knows the
sequence (µi)i≤t. For simplicity, we assume that the at each round t the prior
µt = P(ωt = 1) is bounded in [β, 1− β] for a constant6 β > 0.
We set τ = T−1/2. Our algorithm treats differently profiles Ft ∈ [0, 1]n that
contain at least one extreme forecast Fi,t ∈ [0, τ)∪(1−τ, 1] (which we call extreme
realizations), and profiles Ft ∈ [τ, 1− τ ]n that do not (which we call non extreme
realizations). If we prove the following two Claims:
6Otherwise, in cases where the prior is very extreme, one can apply similar (and in fact
simpler) arguments to those of Section 4.2.2 to deal with such cases. For clarity of the proof we
omit these arguments here.
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1. Within T periods where all realizations are extreme, the total regret is at
most O˜(n
√
T ), and
2. Within T periods where all realizations are non extreme, the total regret is
at most O˜(nσ−1
√
T ),
then it suffices for the proof of the Theorem, because obviously the sum of these
to regrets is an upper bound on the regret in our problem. We start with the proof
of Claim (2).
4.2.1 Algorithm for non extreme realizations
In case A is injective and the aggregator is prior-aware the problem of log-likelihood
aggregation (see Definition 2), which is equivalent to the original forecast aggre-
gation problem, can be further reformulated as follows.
Since the aggregator knows the prior he can deduce the vector z˜ := Ay˜ from
the observed vector Ay˜ + µ˜1n.
In case A is injective it holds that A⊤A is invertible, and hence, denoting the
left inverse of A by A−1l := (A
⊤A)−1A⊤, the optimal aggregation has the form
1m · y˜ + µ˜ = 1⊤mA−1l Ay˜ + µ˜ = (A−1⊤l 1m) · z˜ + µ˜ = h∗ · z˜ + µ˜,
where we denote h∗ := 1mA−1l ∈ Rn - the optimal aggregation of z˜, and now the
equivalent problem can be written as follows.
Input: A history of past realizations (z˜t′ , ωt′)t′<t, where ωt′ is a Bernoulli random
variable with probability of success r∗t′ = (1+exp(−h∗z˜t′− µ˜t′))−1, and the current
vector z˜t ∈ Rn.
Loss: The aggregator chooses a vector ht ∈ Rn and suffers an expected loss of
L˜(ht · z˜t + µ˜t).
Consider the linear hypothesis class H = {z˜ → h · z˜ : h ∈ Rn, ‖h‖ ≤ W}.
Note that for W ≥ ‖A−1⊤l 1m‖, the optimal aggregation vector h∗ belongs to this
class.
Consider the following loss function over a specific instance (z˜t, ωt) given by
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Lt(h) := (1− ωt)(h · z˜t + µ˜t) + ln(1 + exp(−h · z˜t − µ˜t)). (4)
Note that since for all t ∈ [T ], E[ωt | z˜t] = r∗(z˜t) := (1 + exp(−h∗z˜t − µ˜t))−1, it
follows that
∀h ∈ Rn, t ∈ [T ] : Eωt [Lt(h)] = L˜(h · z˜t + µ˜t)]. (5)
Note that the gradient vector of Lt(h) is given by
∇Lt(h) = (1− ωt)z˜t − exp(−h · z˜t − µ˜t)
1 + exp(−h · z˜t − µ˜t) z˜t.
Note also that for all t ∈ [T ], h ∈ Rn, since ωt ∈ {0, 1}, we have that
‖∇Lt(h)‖ ≤ ‖z˜t‖.
Finally, it could be verified via straightforward calculations that the Hessian
matrix of Lt(h), i.e., ∇2Lt(h), is positive semidefinite and hence, for all t ∈ [T ],
Lt(h) is a convex function.
We now turn to introduce our main algorithmic tool, the Online Gradient De-
scent algorithm (OGD), which guarantees sublinear regret for adversarially-chosen
loss functions in repeated games. Both the algorithm and its regret guarantees (in
the context of our setting) are recorded in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. [Online Gradient Descent (see e.g., Hazan [2016])] Consider a se-
quence ((z˜t, ωt, µ˜t))t∈[T ] such that supz˜t ‖z˜t‖ ≤ Z for some Z > 0, and let (Lt(·))t∈[T ]
be the corresponding sequence of loss functions defined according to Eq. (4). Con-
sider a sequence of aggregation vectors (ht)t∈[T+1] generated by the following se-
quential algorithm, known as Online Gradient Descent:
h1 ← 0n; ∀t ∈ [T ] : ht+1 ← Π‖·‖≤W
[
ht −
√
4W 2
Z2T
∇L(ht)
]
, (6)
where Π‖·‖≤W [z] := W zmax{‖z‖,W} denotes the Euclidean projection onto the Eu-
clidean ball of radius W centered at the origin, for some W > 0. Then, it holds
that
T∑
t=1
Lt(ht)− min
h:‖h‖≤W
T∑
t=1
Lt(h) = O
(
WZ
√
T
)
.
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Suppose that we chooseW = σ−1
√
n, and that this choice indeed satisfiesW ≥
‖A−1⊤L 1m‖ = ‖h∗‖ (which we verify in the sequel). We have by a straightforward
application of Lemma 1, followed by taking expectation over both sides of Eq. (6)
w.r.t. the randomness in the sequence (ωt)t∈[T ], and applying Eq. (5) w.r.t. all
t ∈ [T ], that
T∑
t=1
L(h∗ · z˜t + µ˜t)− E
[
T∑
t=1
L(ht · z˜t + µ˜t)
]
= O
(
WZ
√
T
)
,
where W,Z are as defined in Lemma 1.
Thus, it only remains to bound the expressions Z = supz˜t ‖z˜t‖, and W =
supA:σmin(A)≥σ ‖A−1⊤l 1m‖2.
Since forecasts are non-extreme, we know that F ∈ [τ, 1 − τ ]n. This implies
that F˜ ∈ [log(τ) − log(1 − τ), log(1 − τ) − log(τ)]n ⊂ [log(τ),− log(τ)]n, which
implies that z˜t ∈ [log(τ) + log(β),− log(τ) − log(β)]n. We recall that τ = T−1/2
and β is a constant, which implies that Z2 = O(n log2 T ) and Z = O(
√
n log T ).
We turn to verify that for our choice ofW it indeed holds that ‖h∗‖2 ≤W . Let
A = UΣV ⊤ denote the singular value decomposition of A. Also, in the following,
for any matrix M , we let ‖M‖2 denote the spectral norm of M , i.e., its largest
singular value . Using standard manipulations we have that
‖A−1⊤l 1m‖22 = ‖A(A⊤A)−11m‖22 ≤ ‖A(A⊤A)−1‖22 · ‖1m‖22
= m · ‖UΣV ⊤(V Σ2V ⊤)−1‖22 = m · ‖Σ−1‖22 =
m
σmin(A)2
≤ n
σ2
= W 2,
where the last inequality holds using the fact that A is injective, which implies
that m ≤ n, and our assumption that σmin(A) ≥ σ.
Summarizing, the total regret is bounded by O(
√
n log T · √nσ−1 · √T ) =
O˜(nσ−1
√
T ).
4.2.2 Algorithm for extreme realizations
In typical information/forecast aggregation problems the fact that experts might
have very confident forecast helps in aggregating the information (see e.g., Smith and Sørensen
[2000], Arieli et al. [2017b]). For instance, in the extreme case where one of the
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Bayesian experts assigns a probability of 1 to the events that the state is ω = 1,
the aggregator knows (w.p. 1) that the state is indeed ω = 1. The approximate
analogue of this statement (i.e., in case expert’s forecast is very close to 1 rather
than 1) is the following.
Let I ∈ ∆(Ω× S1× ...× Sn) be an arbitrary information structure (not neces-
sarily a partial evidence information structure), when Si is the signal set of expert
i. We define the event ζ0(α) to be the event where at least one expert’s forecast
is in [0, α]. Formally,
ζ0(α) = {(ω, s1, ..., sn) : ∃i ∈ [n] s.t. I(ω = 1, si)
I(ω = 1, si) + I(ω = 0, si)
≤ α}.
Lemma 2. For every α > 0 and every information structure7 I, I(ω = 1|ζ0(α)) ≤
nα. Namely, conditioned on the event that at least one expert has an extreme
forecast in [0, α], the actual probability of ω = 1 is at most nα.
The proof of the lemma is relegated to Appendix A.
We define the event ζ1(α) to be the event where at least one expert’s forecast
is in [1, 1− α], and we have the analogous Lemma.
Lemma 3. I(ω = 0|ζ1(α)) ≤ nα.
From Lemmas 2 and 3 can be deduce the following.
Lemma 4. I(ζ0(α) ∩ ζ1(α)) ≤ 2nα.
The proof is relegated to Appendix A.
We utilize Lemmas 2,3 and 4 to provide a good forecast in case of extreme
realization of forecasts without any learning.
In the event ζ0(τ) \ ζ1(τ) (i.e., an extreme forecast in [0, τ ] and no extreme
forecast in [1− τ ]) the algorithm forecasts r = nτ . In the event ζ1(τ) \ ζ0(τ) (i.e.,
an extreme forecast in [1−τ, 1] and no extreme forecast in [1−τ, 1]) the algorithm
7The linear dependence on n is unavoidable, even if we restrict attention to conditionally i.i.d.
information structures. If α = 1
n
and the i.i.d. information structure has prior 1
4
and binary
posteriors 1
n
and 1
2
− 1
n
with equal ex-ante probability 1
2
, it is easy to verify that conditional on
having an expert who predicts 1
n
there is a constant probability of ≈ 1
12e+1
for ω = 1.
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forecasts r = 1− nτ . In the event ζ0(τ) ∩ ζ1(τ) (i.e., extreme forecasts from both
sides) the algorithm forecasts r = 1
2
. The bounds of Lemmas 2,3 and 4 yield the
following bound on the logarithmic loss in each period:
2[−1 · ln(1− nτ)− nτ ln(nτ)]− 2nτ ln(1
2
) = O(nτ ln(
1
nτ
))
We recall that τ = T−1/2 which implies that the total logarithmic loss is bonded
by O(nT−1/2 log T · T ) = O˜(n√T ). This, in particular, implies the same bound
on the expected regret.
4.3 Proof of Theorem 1
As in the proof of Theorem 1 we focus on the only interesting case where the
static prior µ ∈ [β, 1 − β] is bounded away from the boundaries; i.e., β > 0 is a
constant8.
The algorithm splits into two phases. Phase 1 is used to estimate the prior,
and the Phase 2 uses the estimator from Phase 1, and simply applies the algorithm
from the proof of Theorem 2.
Phase 1 takes T1 = nσ
−1√T periods. The estimator µˆ is simply the fraction
of periods where the state was ωt = 1. Along Phase 1 the algorithm constantly
forecasts r ≡ 1
2
, which yields a total logarithmic loss of T1 ln 2 = O(T1). We
set δ = T
−1/2
1 ln(T ) = O˜(n
−1/2σ1/2T−1/2). By Hoeffding’s inequality, after Phase
1, the probability that the estimator µˆ deviates from the truth µ by more than
|µˆ− µ| > δ is at most 2 exp(−2T1δ2) = O(T−2).
Phase 2 takes the remaining T2 = T − T1 periods. First let us bound the loss
of the algorithm in case the estimator is wrong (i.e., |µˆ − µ| > δ). We bound
from the boundaries {0, 1} the forecast rt made by the algorithm. If the profile
of forecasts F is extreme, then rt ∈ [nτ, 1 − nτ ]. If the profile of forecasts F
is not extreme, then in the log-likelihood space we can bound ||h|| ≤ W and
||z|| = O(√n log T ). Therefore |r˜t| = O(
√
nσ−1 · √n log T ) = O(√nσ−1 log T ).
8The case of extreme prior is not interesting because if the estimation of the prior is close to
the boundaries one can apply similar (and in fact simpler) arguments to those of Section 4.2.2
to deal with such a case.
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Therefore, there exists a constant c > 0 such that rt ∈ [(1+exp(cnσ−1 log T ))−1, 1−
(1 + exp(cnσ−1 log T ))−1]. We denote α = (1 + exp(cnσ−1 log T ))−1.
Note that [α, 1 − α] ⊃ [nτ, 1 − nτ ]. Therefore we deduce that in any case
rt ∈ [α, 1−α]. In every single period the logarithmic loss is bounded by −ln(α) =
O(nσ−1 log T ), which implies that the total loss is Phase 2 is bounded by
O(nσ−1T2 log T2). The probability of a wrong estimator is O(T−2). Therefore, the
event of a wrong estimator adds to the expected loss at most
O(T−2nσ−1T2 log T2) = O(1).
Now we argue that in case the estimator is correct (i.e., |µ − µˆ| ≤ δ), and we
apply the algorithm in the proof of Theorem 2 with an estimator µˆ then during
Phase 2 the algorithm guarantees an expected regret of at most O˜(nσ−1T ).
The log-likelihood function f(x) = ln( x
1−x) has a bounded derivative |f ′(x)| ≤
1
β(1−β) in the segment [β, 1− β]. Therefore, |µ− µˆ| ≤ δ guarantees that |µ˜− ˆ˜µ| ≤
1
β(1−β)δ = O(δ).
Our starting point is the log-likelihood aggregation problem (see Definition 2)
whose formulation is valid for the prior-ignorant aggregator. Unlike the prior-
aware aggregtor, the prior ignorant aggregator cannot deduce z˜ = Ay˜ from Ay˜ +
µ˜1n. However, he has an estimator zˆ to z˜ which satisfies ||zˆ − z˜||∞ ≤ O(δ). Now
we bound |L(h, z˜)− L(h, zˆ)| (see equation (4) for the definition of L(h, z)).
Note that |hz˜ + µ˜ − (hzˆ + ˆ˜µ)| ≤ (h1n + 1) 1β(1−β)δ = O(
√
nWδ). Therefore
|r∗(z˜) − r∗(zˆ)| = O(√nWδ) (because the derivative of the function f(x) = (1 +
exp−x)−1 is bounded by |f ′(x)| ≤ 1
2
). Similarly we note that | ln(1 + exp(hz˜ +
µ˜) − ln(1 + exp(hzˆ + µˆ)| = O(√nWδ) (because the derivative of the function
f(x) = ln(1 + exp(x)) is bounded by |f ′(x)| ≤ 1). By putting all these bounds
together, we get that
|L(h, z˜)− L(h, zˆ)| = O(√nWδ) (7)
We define the hypothesis class H = {zˆ → h · zˆ : h ∈ Rn, ‖h‖ ≤W}. Note that
the optimal hypothesis h∗ = 1mA−1l does not depend on the prior, and thus belongs
to this class. By Lemma 1 the Online Gradient Descent algorithm guarantees a
regret of at most O(WZ
√
T2) with respect to the aggregation h
∗ → h∗zˆ. By
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Equation 7 this aggregation function defers from the optimal one by at most
O(
√
nWδ). Therefore, the maximal total regret is
O(WZ
√
T2 +
√
nWT2δ) = O˜(nσ
−1√T + nσ−1Tn− 12√σT− 12 ) = O˜(nσ−1
√
T ).
The overall expected regret can be bounded by
O(nσ−1
√
T ) +O(T−2) + O˜(nσ−1
√
T ) = O˜(nσ−1
√
T )
where the first term is the regret during Phase 1, the second term is the regret
in case of wrong estimation, and the last term is the regret in case of correct
estimation.
4.4 Proof of Proposition 1
As in Example 1, we consider an aggregtor who knows the prior µ = 0.5 (and thus
µ˜ = 0), knows the evidence matrix A, knows the distribution of signals C, but
observes only F (s) rather than s. The above information is an upper bound on
what the aggregator can learn.
Let z˜ be a vector such that Az˜ = 0n = A0m, and z˜ · 1m 6= 0. Set the distri-
bution of signals C = (Cj)j∈[m] to have the posterior beliefs 12 (with log-likelihood
0) and zj = logit(z˜j) with strictly positive probability. This is possible by the
Aumann Maschler’s Splitting Lemma Aumann et al. [1995], which states that any
distribution over posteriors whose expectation is the prior can be implemented by
some signals. In particular in our case, if w.l.o.g. zj <
1
2
, by adding a third pos-
terior belief z′j >
1
2
we can set the weights on {zj, 12 , z′j} such that the expectation
will turn out to be 1
2
.
With positive probability, the profile of log-likelihoods will be y˜ = 0m, which
yields a report of A0m = 0n. With positive probability, the profile of log-
likelihoods will be y˜ = z˜, which yields the same report Az˜ = 0n. The optimal
aggregation is 0m · 1m = 0 in the first case, and it is z˜ · 1m 6= 0 in the second
case. Namely aggregator cannot perform as good as the optimal aggregation in
the case he observes the report 0n, which occurs with positive probability. Thus
aggregtor’s expected regret is strictly positive in each period.
23
4.5 Proof of Proposition 2
In Arieli et al. [2017a] Proof of Theorem 4, the authors introduce a one-shot mixed
strategy (for the adversary) over conditionally independent information structures
for which no prior-independent aggregation function can get a square loss below
1
4
− ǫ whereas the optimal aggregation has a square loss of at most ǫ. It is easy
to check that for this mixed strategy no prior-independent aggregation function
can get a logarithmic loss below9 ln 2 − ǫ whereas the optimal aggregation has a
square loss of at most ǫ.
Consider an adversary who in each period chooses the information structure
according to this mixed strategy. Then the adversary ensures that the expected
regret (i.e., difference between the loss of the optimal aggregation and the loss of
the algorithm) in each period is ln 2 − ǫ and thus the expected total regret after
T periods is T .
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A Proof of the Lemmas on Extreme Forecasts
Proof of Lemma 2. Without loss of generality we may assume that |Si| = 2 for
every i ∈ [n], because otherwise, we can merge all signals of player i that yield a
posterior in [0, α] into one signal s0i , and merge all signals of player i that yield a
posterior in (α, 1] into one signal s1i . It is easy to verify that if the lemma holds
for the new binary information structure for it yields the same result for I.
For a binary-signal information structure, we identify each signal profiles s =
(si)i∈[n] with the subsets B ⊂ [n] where B = {i ∈ [n] : si = s1i }. We denote
I(ω = 0, B) = a0B and I(ω = 1, B) = a
1
B, where
∑
B a
0
B + a
1
B = 1. The event ζ0(α)
is equivalent to the event B 6= [n], because this is the only signal profile where no
expert has an extreme forecast. The conditional probability is given by
I(ω = 1|ζ0(α)) =
∑
B⊂[n],B 6=[n] a
1
B∑
B⊂[n],B 6=[n] a
0
B + a
1
B
.
.
Therefore maxI I(ω = 1|ζ0(α)) can be written as
max
(aω
B
)B⊂[n],ω=0,1
∑
B⊂[n],B 6=[n] a
1
B∑
B⊂[n],B 6=[n] a
0
B + a
1
B
subject to aωB ≥ 0 ∀B ⊂ [n], ω = 0, 1,∑
B⊂[n],i/∈B a
1
B∑
B⊂[n],i/∈B a
0
B + a
1
B
≤ α ∀i ∈ [n],
(8)
where the second constrain corresponds to the fact that the posterior of expert i
after observing s0i is at most α.
First, we argue that there exists a point a that maximizes (8) where a0B = 0
for every B 6= ∅. Otherwise, if a0B = c, we can replace a0B = 0 and a0∅ = a0∅ + a0B.
Note that the objective function is identical for a and for a, moreover it is easy to
verify that the constrains remain valid.
Second, we argue that there exist a point a that maximizes (8) where a1∅ = 0.
Otherwise, if a1∅ = c, we can replace a
0
∅ = 0 and a
1
{i} = a
1
{i} + c for every i ∈ [n].
Note that the constrains remain unchanged whereas the objective function strictly
increases.
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Third, we note that the maximization problem (8) is homogeneous of degree
0. Therefore we can w.l.o.g. set a0∅ = 1− α.
For the domain of a that satisfies the first and the third property the constrains
in (8) can be simply written as
∑
B⊂[n],i/∈B a
1
B ≤ α. The second property guarantees
that ∑
B⊂[n],B 6=[n]
a1B ≤
∑
i∈[n]
∑
B⊂[n],i/∈B
a1B ≤ nα,
because every element a1B appears at least once in the second summation except
of a1∅, but a
1
∅ = 0 by the second property.
Therefore, the objective functions is bounded by∑
B⊂[n],B 6=[n] a
1
B∑
B⊂[n],B 6=[n] a
0
B + a
1
B
≤ nα
(1− α) + nα ≤ nα.
Proof of Lemma 4. Since I(ω = 0|ζ0 ∩ ζ1) + I(ω = 1|ζ0 ∩ ζ1) = 1, one of these
expressions should be at least 1
2
. W.l.o.g. we assume that I(ω = 1|ζ0 ∩ ζ1) ≥ 12 .
By Lemma 2 (in the other case we use Lemma 3) and Bayes rule we have
nα ≥ I(ω = 1|ζ0) ≥ I(ζ0 ∩ ζ1)
I(ζ0)
I(ω = 1|ζ0 ∩ ζ1)
which implies that
I(ζ0 ∩ ζ1) ≤ nα I(ζ0)
I(ω = 1|ζ0 ∩ ζ1) ≤ 2nα.
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